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THE STRATEGIC DIMENSION OF THE ERISTIC DIA-
LECTIC IN THE CONTEXT OF THE GENERAL THE-
ORY OF CONFRONTATIONAL ACTS  
AND SITUATIONS
Reflection on the topic of eristic, or the art of persuading others that our arguments 
are right in the course of verbal disputes, has a long tradition which dates back to An-
tiquity. Greeks worshipped the goddess Eris, who they believed inspired the mythical 
war between the Achaeans and Trojans. Plato paid considerable attention to the art of 
discussion and employed specific polemic schemes constructing his dialogues. Aris-
totle also addressed this topic profusely in many parts of his work, in particular in the 
treatise entitled On Sophistical Refutations.1
Considerations on discussions and on what makes discussions successful have oc-
cupied peoples’ minds throughout the ages and assumed different forms. For centuries 
it accompanied reflection on superstition and fallacies, as evidenced, for instance, in 
the contributions by Francis Bacon, Isaac Watts, Jeremy Bentham or Immanuel Kant 
(Walton, 1999: 7 ff.).
Tadeusz Kotarbiński wrote in the introduction to the Polish edition of Eristische 
Dialektik oder Die Kunst, Recht zu behalten by Schopenhauer that the art of discussion 
should be approached as a kind of fight. According to Kotarbiński, the theory of dis-
cussion should be embedded in a broader area of the “general theory of confrontational 
1 Aristotle resolved to dedicate his treatise to the cataloguing and identification of the types of 
reasoning which only appear to be correct, and therefore are frequently used in order to mislead those 
who are unable to recognize that they are erroneous. The Stagirite starts his treatise saying: “That some 
reasonings are genuine, while others seem to be so but are not, is evident. This happens with argu-
ments, as also elsewhere, through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham. For physically 
some people are in a vigorous condition, while others merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging 
themselves out as the tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice; and some people are beautiful thanks to 
their beauty, while others seem to be so, by dint of embellishing themselves.” He goes on to list the 
reasons why one can/should examine allegedly correct reasonings: “Now for some people it is better 
worth while to seem to be wise, than to be wise without seeming to be (for the art of the sophist is the 
semblance of wisdom without the reality, and the sophist is one who makes money from an apparent 
but unreal wisdom); for them, then, it is clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise 
man rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so. To reduce it to a single point of contrast it is 
the business of one who knows a thing, himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and 
to be able to show up the man who makes them; and of these accomplishments the one depends on the 
faculty to render an answer, and the other upon the securing of one. Those, then, who would be sophists 
are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid: for it is worth their while: for a faculty of this kind 
will make a man seem to be wise, and this is the purpose they happen to have in view” (Aristotle).
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situations and activities.” He exemplified endeavors to develop the latter by pointing 
to a study entitled Toward a Praxeological Theory of Conflict by Norman Bailey (Bai-
ley: 1081–1112). Importantly, according to Kotarbiński, Bailey “calls for a thorough 
examination of the methods of the possibly most efficient handling of what is useful in 
a confrontation, understood as the combined activities of at least two parties who pur-
sue discordant goals” (Kotarbiński, 1973: 6). This characteristic allows to claim that 
Bailey’s approach is somewhat selective and suggests to think about confrontations 
primarily in terms of tactics.
The tactical approach to eristic is also developing now, as evidenced by numerous 
contemporary studies on different aspects of discussing (e.g. Budzyńska-Daca, Kwosek, 
2009; Kampka, 2014; Lewiński, 2012). The work by Marek Kochan entitled Pojedy-
nek na słowa. Techniki erystyczne w publicznych sporach [Word duel. Eristic techniques 
in public disputes] (Kochan, 2005) is a particularly pronounced example of this trend. 
Kochan says in his book that his intention is not only to complement and update the 
catalogue of stratagems that Schopenhauer wrote about (“This book is based on a canon 
developed by Schopenhauer, who also relied on the works of his predecessors, including 
Aristotle, and attempts to update the catalogue of eristic tricks used in modern debates, 
both those in the media and those conducted in front of a direct audience;” Kochan, 
2005: 12). Additionally, he also proposes to review the steps that may be taken in order to 
block the attacks of an opponent who is using specific kinds of eristic manipulation (“Po-
jedynek na słowa… is not a handbook for demagogues. The descriptions of tricks which 
at least partly serve the purpose of manipulating the interlocutor and recipient is intended 
also as a warning, and to demonstrate the means of defense;” Kochan, 2005: 12). How-
ever, Kochan’s book is one of many guidebooks giving a frog’s-eyeview on conducting 
discussions driven by their participants’ ill will. This type of literature suggests looking 
at an interlocutor as a creator of an obstacle course, in which obstacles must be avoided 
or overcome. At the same time, the book ignores the broader context of communication 
events, instead offering tips on what tactics to use when a certain event occurs in the 
course of a dispute (a similar aim is attempted in the English adaptation of The Eristic 
Dialectic edited by Min Liu; readers are encouraged to buy this work in the following 
manner: “The NEW Art of Being Right is a modern reimagining of Arthur Schopen-
hauer’s classic The Art of Being Right, a classic, but difficult-to-understand tome about 
the art of the debate. The NEW Art of Being Right makes Schopenhauer’s 38 strategies 
for winning arguments (i) EASIER TO UNDERSTAND and (ii) MORE MODERN by 
using CURRENT EXAMPLES of the 38 strategies. In addition, The NEW Art of Being 
Right also provides ADDITIONAL CONTENT AND COMMENTARY not available in 
the original work. In this book, you will learn Schopenhauer’s framework of arguments 
and the 38 strategies for how to persuade and influence others, and defeat and outwit 
your opponents. Diversions, indirect refutations, and other “tricks” are covered in easy 
to understand language and modernized examples. NEVER let someone else (including 
haters, trolls, enemies, and your frenemies) get the best of you again in a debate, verbal 
confrontation, online comment battle, press conference, or flame war!;” Min Liu, 2016; 
The New Art of Being Right…).
Modern studies dedicated to eristic typically ignore the more comprehensive gen-
eral characteristics of the art of discussion. Current considerations on its principles do 
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not inspire readers to perceive discussions and plan them as a highly contextual act. 
Consequently, one can easily stumble upon works which oversimplify the issue, mak-
ing it impossible to perceive commitment to conversation as a strategic activity.
This deficiency can sometimes influence the interpretation of the classic approach 
to this issue. Consequently, publications which demand profound study are oftentimes 
read in haste and without due attention, with the sole purpose of finding only those 
aspects which can apparently be used at once in confrontations with others. This is 
what often happens to the above-mentioned unfinished work by Schopenhauer, The 
Eristic Dialectic.
The original title of the work, Eristische Dialektik oder die Kunst, Recht zu be-
halten, discusses being right and allows at least two different interpretations of the field 
on which Schopenhauer attempted to shed some light (Schopenhauer, 2014). “Recht zu 
behalten” [being right] may be interpreted as a situation in which a participant in a dis-
cussion succeeds in maintaining the audience’s confidence in his being right. However, 
it is also possible to claim that ‘being right’ is about setting conditions in which the 
parties of disputes can and want to address one another, the audience, and the topic 
under discussion in the appropriate manner and following relevant principles.
This duality is well rendered by the English title of Schopenhauer’s work: The Art 
of Being Right (Schopenhauer). However, there is also another interpretation whereby 
the German Eristische Dialektik oder die Kunst, Recht zu behalten is translated as The 
Art of Controversy. The latter translation allows eristic to be perceived exclusively 
in terms of a confrontation whose parties intend to prove that the opponent is wrong 
(even if he or she is actually right).2 This restricted meaning is even more prominent in 
the translation into Polish, which has long been titled Erystyka czyli sztuka prowadze-
nia sporów [Eristic or the art of conducting disputes] (Schopenhauer, 1973).
The above is highly symptomatic and corresponds with the general belief that 
Schopenhauer’s study is in fact a catalogue of 38 stratagems used in order to ma-
nipulate the opponent and the audience in the course of discussion. Another frequently 
stressed fact is a general division of counterarguments into modes and courses, where-
as a much more significant issue is ignored, which Schopenhauer addresses towards 
the end, where he writes: “The only safe rule, therefore, is that which Aristotle men-
tions in the last chapter of his Topica: not to dispute with the first person you meet, but 
only with those of your acquaintance of whom you know that they possess sufficient 
intelligence and self-respect not to advance absurdities; to appeal to reason and not 
to authority, and to listen to reason and yield to it; and, finally, to cherish truth, to be 
willing to accept reason even from an opponent, and to be just enough to bear being 
proved to be in the wrong, should truth lie with him. From this it follows that scarcely 
one man in a hundred is worth your disputing with him. You may let the remainder 
say what they please, for everyone is at liberty to be a fool – desipere est jus gentium. 
Remember what Voltaire says: La paix vaut encore mieux que la vérité. Remember 
also an Arabian proverb which tells us that on the tree of silence there hangs its fruit, 
2 There is one more translation variety of this title on the English market: The Art of Always Be-
ing Right (Schopenhauer, ed. and intr. by A. C. Grayling: 2014) – word always definitely restricts us 
to the second interpretation, taking us in the direction of the eristic dialectic being understood as an 
art in which admitting to one’s error is absolutely ruled out.
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which is peace” (Schopenhauer, The Art of Controversy).3 In light of the above, there 
is a fundamental choice to be made by every potential interlocutor: to discuss or not to 
discuss. This is the very issue which opens the door to strategic thinking in the field of 
the art of discussion.
As opposed to tactical reflections, strategic thinking appears to be broader and deeper, 
and to concern the major reasons for and outcomes of a given act of eristic. It allows tricks 
to be seen not as means of persuasion but as manifestations of human interaction in the 
aftermath of essential communication choices made by the parties. Such a classification 
leads to the question of the boundary conditions which make a discussion successful.
Boundary conditions were discussed by Roman Ingarden in his Książeczka o czło­
wieku [Little book on human being]. In his endeavors to define what makes a discussion 
‘fruitful,’ he noted that: (1) discussion “cannot be only formally free;” (2) it should “stem 
from the genuine internal need of all participants and [should] be conducted while all of 
them retain their internal freedom.” According to Ingarden, this internal freedom emerg-
es “from the need to verify statements encountered or internal beliefs by way of critical 
and unbiased reasoning.” This need may be fulfilled provided that the preliminary condi-
tion of the exchange of opinions being reliable is fulfilled. For this purpose, the parties 
should “suspend […] their own beliefs, claims and even their beloved convictions in 
order to enter discussion being utterly prepared to recognize a different opinion rather 
than intending to enforce one’s own opinion on others,” and be ready to “accurately and 
faithfully” understand the opponent’s standpoint “before resolving to reject or accept it.” 
Ingarden finds these conditions to be the necessary minimum requirements for a discus-
sion to be held “with equal rights, equal effort and equal reliability”, thereby avoiding 
a discussion which is a discussion in name only (Ingarden, 1998: 173–175).
Furthermore, strategic thinking in the field of the art of discussion demands that far-
reaching goals which may be attained by discussion be considered. Such considera-
tions, however, must not be limited to the mere identification of these goals, nor of the 
means to attain them. They should also encompass taking into consideration the side 
effects, both positive and negative, which are likely to be produced in the aftermath of 
a certain sequence of events.
In order to identify and characterize basic discussion strategies it is worthwhile to 
start with the definition of the argumentative statements coined by Krzysztof Szymanek, 
Krzysztof A. Wieczorek, and Andrzej S. Wójcik. According to them, an “[an] argumenta-
tive statement uses some statements (premises) in order to justify another statement which 
is controversial by assumption (conclusion). The composition of statements encompassing 
the premises and the conclusions and extracted from an argumentative statement is named 
argument (argument included in the statement)” (Szymanek, Wieczorek, Wójcik, 2003: 9).
3 Although this edition was prepared on the basis of a translation by T. Bailey Saunders it was 
furnished with the formerly criticized, unidimensional title of The Art of Controversy (suggested by 
the translator). Nevertheless, numerous other issues of this work that have been published under the 
title The Art of Being Right, which renders the original ambiguity, end with a brief presentation of 
the last trick, thereby meaning that it was not considered worthwhile to present the complete text to 
readers. In this manner, readers of the English translation of this work may stumble upon the full text 
bearing an unfortunate title, or translations which, under a fortunate title, do not present the entire 
text. Since readers rarely compare different editions of the same book, or verify the accuracy of trans-
lation, they are typically doomed to one of the two distortions.
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The authors of the above concept stress the fact that the conclusion is controversial 
by assumption. It is also assumed that premises are not controversial. Thus, disputants 
adopt two hypotheses forming their argumentative statements. One is that the audience 
to which the argument is addressed does not consider the conclusion to be obvious, 
thus requiring the speakers to justify their claims and convince the audience of their 
correctness. The other is the belief that the audience will accept the premises, thereby 
approving of the conclusion. These two hypotheses result in arguments which are un-
certain in two respects. The speakers may be wrong both about the controversial nature 
of the conclusion and about the non-controversial nature of premises. If they are wrong 
about at least one of those, their strategy will be implemented on the basis of an errone-
ous identification of the context.
There are three possible variations of argumentative strategies employed on the ba-
sis of erroneous assumptions made by the disputants. Firstly, the person presenting the 
argument may erroneously assume that the conclusion of the message is controversial 
for the audience. In such circumstances, the disputant is frequently perceived as some-
one who does not understand certain facts, or as naïve. Such a lack of knowledge lead-
ing him or her to discuss matters which do not raise any controversy typically results 
in the audience’s disengagement. They perceive the disputant as ignorant and therefore 
incompetent and uninteresting. Therefore, the audience will not pay attention, or may 
become irritated due to the fact that their time is being wasted.
In other circumstances, the disputant is confident that he or she have selected con-
vincing premises which, however, turn out to be as dubious as the conclusion itself. In 
this context, the disputant is perceived as a radical who has not taken the audience into 
account. Therefore, the argumentative act may arouse concern, anger or a mixture of 
these emotions in the audience. The disputant cannot be evaluated as convincing in this 
context, because he or she is seen as dangerous and alien. The audience frequently feel 
they should not listen to, but rather oppose those who are pursing to convince them.
The third situation is the most extreme and occurs when the disputant erroneously 
estimates the attitude of the audience and defends a conclusion which is not contro-
versial to them by means of controversial premises. In such a situation, the audience 
sees the disputant as both inept and a troublemaker. The disputant may be perceived as 
being driven by irrational motivations, creating controversy where there is none. This 
makes the audience assess him or her as dangerous on account of his or her incompre-
hensible lack of adjustment to reality. People applying this argumentative strategy are 
frequently perceived as wasting social energy. Under extreme conditions, they can be 
cast as public enemies or scapegoats.
All three above-mentioned situations are problematic, as they involve inadequate 
analysis of the context in which an argumentative act is performed. The three solutions 
which follow are grounded on an accurate analysis of a communication situation in 
which the disputant can act. Nevertheless, it remains debatable whether the solutions 
taken into consideration below are worth recommending. It is true that, due to the 
adequate selection of the argumentative toolkit, they allow to achieve the assumed 
short- or medium-term objectives. Yet the matter of side effects which may emerge as 
a result of the objectives achievement remains unresolved. In most general terms, in 
the argumentative strategies concerned, the disputant plays the role of a person who 
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only appears to be wrong about (1) the controversial nature of the conclusions they are 
formulating, (2) the non-controversial nature of premises, or (3) both.
In the first scenario, the disputant pretends to be a naive person who is unaware of 
the true tensions and conflicts that the audience are interested in. In this manner he or 
she demonstrates his or her own absentmindedness, thereby inviting the audience to 
not take him or her seriously. Sometimes it enables the disputant to create a space in 
which he or she can function in the conditions of relaxed social control. In other situa-
tions, the disputant may inspire the audience’s sympathy, which sometimes allows him 
or her to benefit from different manifestations of the audience’s good will.
In the second scenario the disputants refers to premises which they expect not to be 
convincing enough to make the audience accept the conclusion he or she is advocating. 
Additionally, the justification presented is sometimes more controversial to the audience 
than the conclusion itself, which is something the disputant has predicted. Here, the dispu-
tant plays the role of a provocateur, seeking to raise the audience’s resentment about both 
the arguments and the disputant himself or herself. If this is successful, he or she responds 
to this resentment by trying to turn it to his or her advantage (for instance stepping into the 
role of an enfant terrible or a person who is discriminated against for no reason).
The third strategy consists of the disputant referring to a non-controversial conclusion 
and controversial premises. Employing this strategy, the disputant is trying to play the 
role of an irrational/awkward person who creates problems. For instance, someone may 
present himself or herself as an alien who cannot understand the customs he or she comes 
across. It may happen that the audience will interpret this attitude as a challenge. In ex-
treme situations this strategy may lead to the change of dominant views on what should 
and what should not be seen as controversial. The disputant may then step into the role of 
a visionary who sees further and knows more and is/was able to really change the world.
All three strategies carry the danger of excessive identification with the role. The 
disputant who succeeds in his or her argumentative acts may gradually develop a habit 
of performing in the same way all the time. In the long run, this may result in a situ-
ation when specific persuasive and argumentative tricks become second nature to the 
sender and this manner of creating communicative relations with others becomes intui-
tive. This can result in the communicative code of the disputant being narrowed down. 
As a consequence, his or her ability to absorb new argumentative forms and content 
wanes. The disputant expresses a specific style but loses flexibility and the freedom of 
searching and creating by himself or herself.
The above six strategies are in contrast with the seventh strategy. This occurs when 
the disputant presents the audience with a genuinely controversial conclusion, having 
selected premises which are convincing enough to make the audience accept it. The 
successful implementation of this strategy is usually the most efficient way of build-
ing the disputant’s identity, as well as of respecting the audience’s identity. On a mi-
croscale, this may translate into the formation of deeper interpersonal relations (both 
cooperative and competitive) in which neither manipulation nor exploitation occurs. 
On a macroscale, the propagation of this discussion strategy emerges as a significant 
factor to facilitate social order based on understanding the ‘Other.’
The above strategies may be successfully applied to analyze specific communica-
tion situations and to try to determine who performs what role in the course of discus-
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sion and how they do it. This allows deeper reflection to be conducted on different 
ways of responding to the attitudes of discussion participants in a given situation.
The issue of the prospects of considerations on the strategies of exchanging argu-
ments is worth addressing. Beyond doubt, broad and deeper reflection in this field is 
still not satisfactory in the contemporary social sciences, especially in communication 
studies. However, successful explorations into the strategic aspects of discussion stays 
highly desirable. Yet an in-depth discussion on how to achieve the above is way be-
yond the limits of this paper (Hordecki, 2009: 39–52).
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ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to describe the strategic dimension of the eristic dialectic, which is fre-
quently defined as the art of the dispute. This goal is embedded in reflections on the general the-
ory of confrontational acts and situations. The text stresses the fact that strategic thinking about 
the art of discussion is not given sufficiently deep consideration. Another observation pertains 
to the fact that the essence of the strategic design of discussions lies in the analysis of long-term 
results, which can be attained in the course of the exchange of arguments. At the same time, 
this analysis must not be limited exclusively to identifying the objectives of the discussion or 
the means of attaining them. Argumentative strategy also includes reflection on the side effects, 
both positive and negative, which may be the product of a specific communication practice.
 
Keywords: general theory of conflicts, eristic dialectics, strategic thinking, strategies of argu-
mentation
WYMIAR STRATEGICZNY DIALEKTYKI ERYSTYCZNEJ W KONTEKŚCIE 
OGÓLNEJ TEORII DZIAŁAŃ I SYTUACJI KONFLIKTOWYCH 
 
STRESZCZENIE
W tekście podjęto próbę scharakteryzowania wymiaru strategicznego dialektyki erystycznej, 
często określanej jako sztuka prowadzenia sporów. Realizację powyższego zadania starano się 
wpisać w przestrzeń refleksji z zakresu ogólnej teorii działań i sytuacji konfliktowych. W ra-
mach tekstu wskazano na fakt, że strategiczne myślenie o sztuce dyskusji pozostaje zjawiskiem, 
które stale wymaga pogłębionego nad nim namysłu. Wskazano również, że istota strategiczne-
go projektowania dyskusji polega na analizie dalekosiężnych rezultatów, które można osiągać 
w toku wymiany argumentów. Przy czym, refleksja, o której mowa, nie może ograniczać się 
tylko i wyłącznie do określenia celów dyskusji, jak również wskazania środków, przy pomocy 
których mogą być one urzeczywistniane. Strategia argumentacyjna obejmuje również refleksję 
nad skutkami ubocznymi – zarówno o charakterze pozytywnym, jak i negatywnym – które 
wystąpić mogą jako następstwo określonej praktyki komunikacyjnej.
 
Słowa kluczowe: ogólna teoria konfliktu, dialektyka erystyczna, myślenie strategiczne, strate-
gie argumentacyjne
